tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post3808821898610999108..comments2023-10-07T07:20:25.103-07:00Comments on Turing Consciousness 2012: Antonio Damasio: Feelings and SentienceUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger28125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-17833846337464837772022-07-20T18:27:32.674-07:002022-07-20T18:27:32.674-07:00Comments are closed nowComments are closed nowStevan Harnadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14374474060972737847noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-49025321241483295072013-07-31T03:54:32.853-07:002013-07-31T03:54:32.853-07:00Is 'felt' sensation possible without compa...Is 'felt' sensation possible without comparison & memory ? Even a new 'feeling' is always compared against 'the memory of not feeling it' ? So, isn't it obvious that 'feeling' is linked to 'memory' & 'learning' ? 'Homeostasis' is not the only goal. 'Exploration & learning' does anything but help 'homeostasis' (or only very very indirectly).dreamerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08040554646286418512noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-71475794633561350502012-08-02T19:30:55.428-07:002012-08-02T19:30:55.428-07:00MUTE MENTATION
The question is not whether anothe...<b>MUTE MENTATION</b><br /><br />The question is not whether another entity feels the way we do, but whether it feels at all.<br /><br />(To my mind, the suggestion that organisms that don't have language don't feel is completely absurd -- not even worth considering, except for sci-fi.)Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-47175953853173230262012-08-01T18:10:06.288-07:002012-08-01T18:10:06.288-07:00How? Why?How? Why?Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-19144340738802953032012-07-31T11:08:49.783-07:002012-07-31T11:08:49.783-07:00As we have studied Damasio's work almost exclu...As we have studied Damasio's work almost exclusively during the first weeks of a seminar on neuroscience and anthropology (conscience, emotions, etc.) and we have talked about it at lengths since that time (more than a year now) among colleagues in bioanthropology (UdeM) ... I have not learned anything new in Damasio's talk. However, it was a real TREAT to see him live at the summer school, everyone there was lucky !<br /><br />What captivates me the most in Damasio's view of consciousness is it's direct connection with the most basic imperative of life: the struggle to maintain homeostasis. Immanent to life itself, homeostasis has been entirely conserved (and greatly complexified) throughout evolution, but we don't think about directly any more than an amoeba; that doesn't mean consciousness hasn't got anything to do with it ! Homeostasis underlies (more or less deeply) every behavior - behavior being used here in the broadest possible sense, conscious or not. <br /><br />Anyways, thank you prof. Damasio for making me realize this to its full extent, we'll continue thinking along those lines.Xavier Déryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06524854063079690566noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-5420665023375248742012-07-31T09:50:37.531-07:002012-07-31T09:50:37.531-07:00This is an interesting point. But I guess Dr. Dama...This is an interesting point. But I guess Dr. Damasio could point out that empathy and compassion are related to homeostasis, albeit in a somewhat indirect way. Maintaining homeostasis requires taking precautions when you are acting on feelings of compassion and empathy. It requires sophisticated action planning (which is always done consciously). If I want to help a friend who is drowning in a river, I must do so in a way that does not put me in too much danger. If I don’t know how to swim or if the water is extremely cold, for instance, I had better not jump in the water to try to rescue him. I will first try to devise a plan that takes into account my well-being.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12747519028502353388noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-74165160446936625082012-07-29T10:38:40.940-07:002012-07-29T10:38:40.940-07:00I think this is what MJR's remark (first comme...I think this is what MJR's remark (first comment on this page) was getting at, and I interpreted a few of Dr. Damasio's points as also suggesting that this might be the case. At any rate, it seems to me the most intuitive approach to the whole feeling/doing distinction.Nico Sheppard-Joneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06708998539468230469noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-2029619043933693452012-07-28T08:35:16.467-07:002012-07-28T08:35:16.467-07:00Extending the range of studied doings to include m...Extending the range of studied doings to include more elaborate behaviors or thought processes that are characteristic of the primate repertoire (i.e. like social decision-making) offers probably the best chance to identify any function of feelings. My argument simply follows from the demonstration by some speakers (e.g. Sossin) that entire behavioral repertoires can be produced without any apparent conscious thoughts in lower animals.Sebastien Tremblayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07853545734388259101noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-87169513481417068672012-07-25T11:48:16.476-07:002012-07-25T11:48:16.476-07:00Originally posted on facebook
TURING CONSCIOUSNESS...Originally posted on facebook<br />TURING CONSCIOUSNESS:<br />“Homeostasis requires sensing of body states -- but why felt sensing? Why not just detect and do what needs to be done?”<br />JULES PELLETIER: <br />“Would an asocial human stranded and raised in isolation on an island feel or would he just react to bodily needs ?”<br />MARJORIE MORIN<br />“@ Jules : I guess your question could be answered thinking of animals. Do animals have a consciousness? Do they feel their hunger or just act on them? As we have seen Dennet thinks that since the language is missing, animals and newborns aren't experiencing consciousness (I was really surprised by that statement), at least not as we grown-ups do. When thinking about language there is always the problem of mute people and apes that learn sign language. They do have a language, but not the same as we do, what about their consciousness? I'm really a newbie in this field so I'm just thinking of some points that can be adressed. But in his view, and he told it himself, the isolated person wouldn't experience consciousness as we do. Damasio's point of view on the other end was more open to an animal possible consciousness, he said that we couldn't know if they feel since they cannot tell us. I don't know if I'm right but it seems that language was less important for his theory than for Dennet's. I'm still confused by the difference between feeling versus emotions, versus sensations, I guess as the 10 days passes (and reading is done) it will become clearer!”Marjorie Morinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18128987553493264083noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-76983726865787553532012-07-25T11:47:09.624-07:002012-07-25T11:47:09.624-07:00Originally posted on facebook
"I don't kn...Originally posted on facebook<br />"I don't know if some of you can help me with this question, but while listening to Damasio's talk, I was asking myself how when you feel compassion or empathy you could "map" your body states. Is there really a body state associated with compassion or empathy (He said that mental contents of feelings corresponds to description of aspects of body states)? If thinking about empathy, we know that we imitate the other unconsciously in order to comprehend what he/she is experiencing, it really isn't a complete enough "bodily state" to create a feeling of empathy with. Empathy also need self-awareness to know that it's the other and not the self that is experiencing this emotion. I think it's quite a challenge to explain (or maybe not?)!"Marjorie Morinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18128987553493264083noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-36025315108996219412012-07-24T15:05:08.314-07:002012-07-24T15:05:08.314-07:00Does feeling make us better at doing?Does feeling make us better at doing?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13795726068676548183noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-77838129798965220912012-07-22T14:43:30.978-07:002012-07-22T14:43:30.978-07:00Extending our definition of doings to include more...Extending our definition of doings to include more doings will explain feeling?Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-6873805720804995812012-07-22T12:07:14.751-07:002012-07-22T12:07:14.751-07:00Inge : “Why is it important that we FEEL?”
This qu...Inge : “Why is it important that we FEEL?”<br />This question arises from the apparent independence of the adaptive value of observable doings from the abstract and yet biologically unexplainable feelings. But this independence seems to me as an assumption derived from the study of computational and biological models with limited behavioural repertoires compared to primates. Extending our definition of doings to include a wider behavioural repertoire appears to me like a necessary step to be able to offer an evolutionary explanation to feelings.Sebastien Tremblayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07853545734388259101noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-64017564055184381402012-07-17T08:03:06.563-07:002012-07-17T08:03:06.563-07:00(Thanks for relaying the reply, Stevan!)(Thanks for relaying the reply, Stevan!)Martha Shiellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15327296650316006983noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-64284278300707952672012-07-16T10:20:35.380-07:002012-07-16T10:20:35.380-07:00Homeostasis and the representation thereof to ones...Homeostasis and the representation thereof to oneself is certainly a key concept. I think it is the one thing that everything we've heard during the conference builds upon. Robotics is facing the challenge of self-monitoring states and integrating information from the outside world, we learned about aplysia and about all sorts of animals and how they face these challenges, the evolutionary perspectives examine how this system can become more and more sophisticated and the neuropsychology representatives taught us more about how integration of information is achieved.<br /><br />All that is fine and well, but I guess I'm starting to see the question now: Why is it important that we FEEL ? Can all this not be achieved without our consciousness? And indeed a lot of it is. <br /><br />However, I think Searle, at the end of the conference, kind of put things into perspective again: Yeah, OK, maybe it could have been done without the feeling, but we THAT'S NOT THE WAY IT IS, WE DO FEEL. Somehow I feel that studying what is is the way forward and Damasio brought in a fantastic perspective: apart from the information processing we do of the outside world, we do a fantastic amount of processing of the inside world as well and this needs to be taken into consideration.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16849170399668500419noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-37228359487710941742012-07-16T08:56:30.745-07:002012-07-16T08:56:30.745-07:00POSTED ON FACEBOOK BY STEVAN HARNAD (June, 29th) :...POSTED ON FACEBOOK BY STEVAN HARNAD (June, 29th) :<br /><br />"Learning and prediction, yes: But why felt?"Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16207920104245170860noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-42582556527329334142012-07-16T08:54:19.850-07:002012-07-16T08:54:19.850-07:00PAULINE CLAUDE :
"I'm not a 100 % sure bu...PAULINE CLAUDE :<br />"I'm not a 100 % sure but... Empathy requires the activation of mirror neurons. The same mirror neurons fire both when someone do a specific action and when she/he observes another person doing the same action. That's what happen with empathy, wich means that the same neuronal network is being activated when you see someone feeling sad for instance and when you are sad yourself. Then, there are the same neurones that activate body mapping. Of course, other cognitive processes (such as others awareness) have to be engaged in the phenomenon to remind the brain that the person experiencing sadness is not yourself but the person you are looking at. This leads to the question of the evolution of sociality (in the primate way) and self- and others-awareness... which one came first? We know that only a few species have the capacity of self-awareness compared to species that have the capacity of others-awareness. This is mere speculation but, would it be possible that in primates, specific environmental constrains forced individuals to live in groups when they were not used to, leading to a new adaptation consisting of a new neuronal mechanism evaluating other's behavior in order to maximize your own survival and reproduction for mere egoistic purposes, which means the need of self-awareness..."<br /><br />INGE BROER :<br />"Here's a path to explore: There is a form of meditation where the main goal is to cultivate compassion and empathy for fellow humans. Practice includes reciting specific words and phrases in order to evoke a boundless warm-hearted feeling."<br /><br />STEVAN HARNAD :<br />"Everything I feel is "my" feeling, hence, I suppose, about my body. But beyond that, I do not see why all or even most feelings should be somatic in any other respect than that they feel like something."<br /><br />PAULINE CLAUDE :<br />"How could a feeling not be somatic?"<br /><br />STEVAN HARNAD :<br />"It feel like something to believe 2 + 2 = 4 (or to disbelieve it). Feeling is in general only somatic in that it's our body that feels as if it's feeling."<br /><br />PAULINE CLAUDE :<br />"But, don't we have a problem with the definition itself of feeling? because, from my understanding of Damasio's point of view, a feeling is not necessarily felt in the sense that it tells the brain that a homeostatic need has to be fulfilled but doesn't reach necessarily the level of consciousness in the sense "I know that my brain know that something is going on". However, can the fact that the brain recognizes a signal (a feeling) as a homeostatic need without reaching the level "I know that my brain know" be considered as conscioussness?"Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16207920104245170860noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-73227601913534986682012-07-16T08:50:40.886-07:002012-07-16T08:50:40.886-07:00POSTED ON FACEBOOK BY MARJORIE MORIN :
"I do...POSTED ON FACEBOOK BY MARJORIE MORIN :<br /><br />"I don't know if some of you can help me with this question, but while listening to Damasio's talk, I was asking myself how when you feel compassion or empathy you could "map" your body states. Is there really a body state associated with compassion or empathy (He said that mental contents of feelings corresponds to description of aspects of body states)? If thinking about empathy, we know that we imitate the other unconsciously in order to comprehend what he/she is experiencing, it really isn't a complete enough "bodily state" to create a feeling of empathy with. Empathy also need self-awareness to know that it's the other and not the self that is experiencing this emotion. I think it's quite a challenge to explain (or maybe not?)!"Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16207920104245170860noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-85882450723467706002012-07-13T08:42:54.528-07:002012-07-13T08:42:54.528-07:00If you are hearing the beautiful sounds then you a...If you are hearing the beautiful sounds then you are feeling (what it feels like to hear) the beautiful sounds. So, no "juxtaposition," just identity.<br /><br />You can, of course, juxtapose feelings and feelings.<br /><br />Why beautiful music sounds beautiful rather than just acoustic is another matter, closer to the question of why sugar tastes sweet and inviting rather than neutral than to the question of why anything feels like anything at all.Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-71431587446415229562012-07-12T12:20:32.598-07:002012-07-12T12:20:32.598-07:00Comme je suis actuellement très intéressée par l&#...Comme je suis actuellement très intéressée par l'impact des débats sur la conscience par rapport à la conceptualisation de l'esthétique en musique, je n'ai pu m'empêcher d'accrocher sur cette phrase dite par Damasio lors de la période de question:<br /><br />"You could juxtapose your feelings with beautiful sounds"<br /><br />J'essaie de comprendre ici ce que cette phrase implique. Selon Damasio, est-ce que les sons eux-mêmes sont porteurs de l'expérience esthétique (beautiful sounds)? L'expérience esthétique musicale réside-t-elle dans la juxtaposition d'états émotionnels déjà présents sur le stimulus auditif? Alors, est-ce que les sons révèlent à la conscience l'état émotionnel ou n'est-ce pas plutôt l'état émotionnel qui confère aux sons leur "beauté"?Roxane Campeauhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066829025824430026noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-5293501404213469602012-07-11T14:44:43.134-07:002012-07-11T14:44:43.134-07:00Perhaps we should look at marine beings, because f...Perhaps we should look at marine beings, because fish don't necessary have feelings?kriszthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17001192238378809280noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-42965780438313942282012-07-11T12:57:48.611-07:002012-07-11T12:57:48.611-07:00ANTONIO DAMASIO:
To Carey YL Huh. It is not a re...ANTONIO DAMASIO:<br /><br />To Carey YL Huh. It is not a redundancy. Practically all the systems we can consider, sensory as well as motor, have different ways of achieving somewhat comparable but not quite equal goals. The different ways are related to different levels of the neuraxis, from the bottom of the spinal goals to the brain stem and to the cortex. The operation of those varied levels is connected with a different kind of other process. Cortical feeling, for example, relates to factual memory, imagination and reason. Brain stem feeling relates to a host of defense mechanisms. Only the overall goal — life regulation — is the same.Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-4327653325107602902012-07-11T12:57:17.542-07:002012-07-11T12:57:17.542-07:00ANTONIO DAMASIO:
To Martha Shiell. First, an amo...ANTONIO DAMASIO:<br /><br />To Martha Shiell. First, an amoeba has some degree of “sentience” if not consciousness. Second, I did emphasize the simplicity of the system. Third, I was not making a comparison, fair or unfair.Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-80336542233145013252012-07-11T12:56:21.409-07:002012-07-11T12:56:21.409-07:00UNDONE DEAL
SH: "Why/how are felt layers of...UNDONE DEAL<br /><br />SH: "Why/how are felt layers of homeostatic control more effective than just done layers of homeostatic control?" <br /><br />MJR: Perhaps "done layers of homeostatic control" are done by feeling them.<br /><br />Sounds like solving a tough problem with a tautology (or a definition)...<br /><br />No, it is inescapable that homeostasis is homeostasis (doing). We can generate homeostasis with adaptive servomechanisms (doing). We can make them more and more complicated and capable (still doing). How and why at some point all of this makes a phase transition into feeling is still awaiting an explanation. (So far, not even a clue of a clue...)Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2234592903154254594.post-14995944861182931812012-07-11T12:48:49.396-07:002012-07-11T12:48:49.396-07:00FROM ANTONIO DAMASIO:
To Maxwell J. Ramstead, I a...FROM ANTONIO DAMASIO:<br /><br />To Maxwell J. Ramstead, I am pleased you got my point. Yes, feeling itself might be the unit of selection. And yes, it might be an explanation. But the evidence suggests that there are integrated maps of body state operating without feeling and still effective as regulating agents.Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.com